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As man socialized and the human population clustered into geograph-
ically, culturally, and politically defined nation states, reaping the ma-
terial benefits of specialization and efficiency, human interaction increased
both within and among these states. However, because of the sheer mag
nitude of the environment and its assimilative capacity in relation to hu-
man populations and industrial production, in the historical past there
was little, if any, interaction between states that involved a purely non-
human or environmental element. A nation's waterborne wastes were
easily assimilated by river, estuary, and coastal waters before such wastes
could interfere with other nations' activities. No state produced and
consumed chemical compounds that were not easily neutralized by a
seemingly infinite natural environment. In the past few decades, such a
perception of the natural environment has increasingly changed to the
realization that the planet's environmental assimilative capacity, even aug-
mented by substantial investment, cannot sustain an endlessly growing
population or material consumption per capita. Nations are coming to
realize that not only are they economically and politically interdependent
but also environmentally dependent with no well-defined international
markets or political mechanisms for efficient regulation.
Economic science has analyzed problems of nonmarket interdependence
for a very long time, applying the concept of externalities since Pigou. In
essence, externalities are social interdependencies not taken into account
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byformal markets or by agreements between the affected individuals or
nations. Thus, externalities embrace a spectrum of problems from the
neighbor's noisy and disturbing stereo to the commitment of all nations
today toward rapid economic development which may preclude choices
between material consumption and aesthetic enjoyment of future nations.
In either case, the affected party's, i.e. the disturbed neighbor's or future
generations', preferences are not adequately being considered when a deci-
sion is made.
The classical economic solution to such externality problems was to
"internalize" them by either developing a well-defined market for the
'spillovers" or controlling them through collective provision of regula.
tions. Neither of these possibilities appears easily amenable to the problem
of transfrontier externalities in general, and environmental externalities
in particular. First, environmental externalities have arisen because most
dimensions of the natural environment on a regional or global scale are
resources without rigidly defined or enforceable ownership rights. The
oceans, stratosphere, and electromagnetic spectrum are typical examples.
These resources are viewed as being commonly owned or not owned at
all. A nation which agreed to a particular pattern of ownership of these
resources could potentially lose some of its implicitly controlled resources
and thereby national wealth.1 As long as international entitlements are
obscure, any nation can lay implicit claim to the common property re-
source exceeding any equitable share it may presume to receive if entitle-
ment were made explicit. This is not to say that once some other nation
impinges on a nation's perceived implicit entitlement, that it will not find
a negotiated settlement and thereby explicit entitlement to be superior
to an implicit one. However, the impinging nation, in negotiating, must
revise downward its own perceived ownership of the common property
resource. In consequence, proceeding from a situation of implicit entitle-
ments of common property resources to explicit regulation and thereby
ownership means that some (or all) nations must revise their expectations
of national wealth, stemming from the resources that each implicitly be-
lieves it controls.
A second aspect of major importance arises from the concept of na-
I. Christy draws a very useful distinction between the production of wealth and dis-
tribution or ownershipwealth with regard to ocean fisheries. The first concept in-
volves issues of access and free use while the second involves specification of shares.
The discussion in this paper will be centered on distributional as opposed to use
issues. See F. T. Christy Jr., "Fisheries: Common Property, Open Access, and the Com-
mon Heritage," Pacern in Man boa, edited by Elizabeth M. Borghese (New York: Dodd,
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tionalsovereignty. Not unlike consumer sovereignty as conceptualized by
economists, national sovereignty implies the idea that governments, act-
ing in their own interest will, omitting deviations in power or information
implying political or economic monopoly, achieve the greatest welfare for
all by independently pursuing autonomous goals and interacting com-
petitively through international markets. The belief in national sov-
ereignty as an ideal is so imbedded that it is impractical to presume it
will be easily given up.
Coupling the concepts of national sovereignty in decisions and the idea
that implicit, as opposed to explicit, entitlement of international com-
mon property resources yields a greater perceived wealth for nations, is
suggestive that resolution of transnational externality problems will gen-
erally need to be embedded within the following restrictions:
1. No nation will easily accept international agreement on entitlement of
significant common property resources without compensating payments to
retain its perception of national wealth. In consequence, the classical answer
to externality problems of internalizing the decision-making process for the
resource is not easily transferable to transnational problems. A new over-
riding element of distributional gains and losses must be simultaneously
included in efficiency consideration.
2. Undirectional transnational externalities, if they are of substantial Im-
portance to the emitter country as a method of waste disposal, will in gen-
eral be resolved by some form of a compensation system where compensation
flows from the receptor country. The nonliability case (or'victims must
pay" principle) will generally be dominant.2 This is to be contrasted with
the reciprocal environmental externality case where compensation may flow
in either or both directions.
3. International court settlements of transnational externalities are not
likely to yield satisfactory results. There appear to be three almost insur-
mountable problems. First, how are damages to be measured and damage
payments assessed? The receptor country's social values may be strikingly
different than the emitter country's. In consequence, there may not be a so-
cial welfare index that is applicable or acceptable by both. If the damage
is entirely confined to hindering production in the receptor country, then
international trading prices, at least at the margin, offer a measure of wel-
fare loss. However, if the impact is on individual citizens with no market
prices representing their losses, then a measure of welfare loss is not available
2. The appearance of reciprocity may negate this statement, particularly in those
cases where an external diseconomy in one direction between countries is offset by an
external economy in the opposite direction.400 RALPH D'ARGE
except through direct examination and questioning. A very striking exam-
ple of this is the preservation of Nubian monuments behind the Aswan Dam
where the value is only to "all of humanity" In addition, there may be un-
certainty as to the magnitude of loss unless the externality is allowed to con-
tinue to the point of maximum damages, i.e., threshold levels of fish popu-
lations. And, with irreversible biological or other processes, this becomes a
dangerous, if not intolerable, experiment. Second, given the sovereign rights
of nations, no nation can be forced to pay environmental damages. The
trade-off here is in terms of loss of international prestige and goodwill or
increasing the possibility of conflict versus monetary payments based on pos-
sibly misrepresented public preferences of the receptor nation. Third, there
isbasically the'chicken and egg" problem of historical precedent most
dramatized by airports and noise pollution. An airport is built drawing in
people that then are affected by airport noise. As Coase cogently stated the
problem, who is responsible? Who is the polluter in the 'polluter must pay
principle"? As environmental problems increase in severity and potential
damages induced among countries rise, it seems that assigning responsibility
will become increasingly difficult. Iii this context, there is also the problem
of assigning damages when more than one nation's waste residuals contrib-
ute to total damages. If the different nations' residuals are synergistic or if
damages are nonlinear relationships of waste intensity, then there is no easy
method of determining how much responsibility each nation should take
even with the "polluter must pay all costs and remaining damages" princi-
ple. Thus, it can be anticipated that international courts or international
commissions will have difficulty in arbitration even if such institutions were
given partial regulatory powers.
To conclude this rather negative introduction, transfrontier environ-
mental externalities are not likely to be resolved by international organi-
zations without some form of compensation to both countries—an tin-
likely case unless a transnational external economy can be discovered to
offset the inherent costs of a transnational external diseconomy.3 In this
paper, I attempt to develop a rather abbreviated taxonomic discussion of
models on transnational environmental externalities and analyze them in
the context of bilateral anti multilateral negotiation. Tue role of inter-
national tribunals, courts, or management commissions is not analyzed
3. It should be recognized that a grcat many offsetting ncgotiations which arc indi-
rect, i.e. without direct monetary compensation, occur currently. The rule is preferen-
tial nation status, military gifts, U. N. vote commitments, economic aid unrelated to
the conflict "a priori," often arc a form of compensation. Direct monetary compensa-
tion is only one form of retribution within the context of intergovernmental arbitrage
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explicitly except as an occasional point of reference for "ideal" efficient
utilization and distribution of global environmental resources.
Wealth Effects of Transnational Externalities in Production
In order to clarify taxonomically transnational externalities, we shall
employ the traditional concepts of production and utility relationships in
economics. In so doing, externalities will be divided into four categories.
1. The first category is externalities generated in production processes that
affect production costs and processes in other nations. Examples include
industrial water pollution that requires treatment before industrial use in
a downriver nation or the salt pollution of the Colorado River by U. S. agri-
cultural tailings' water that reduces farm productivity in Mexico.
2. The second category is externalities generated in production in one coun-
try that do not affect production but degrade the environment of citizens in
other countries. An example might be the acid rains in Scandinavia ema-
nating from the Ruhr industrial complex.
3. The third category is externalities generated by acts of consumption or
final use of goods which affect production costs, i.e. rude tourists.
4. The fourth category is externalities generated by acts of consumption
which influence environmental quality in other countries,i.e. municipal
wastes affecting recreational use of Lake Erie. It appears relevant that for
transfrontier environmental externalities the first two cases could be con-
sidered the dominant ones currently. However, as urban sprawl continues
and populations centralize and enlarge, pollution from acts of consumption
might become increasingly relevant as a transnational problem. Municipal
wastes in the Great Lakes and elsewhere offer support for this allegation.
In addition to classifying externalities on the basis of source such as
production processes or acts of consumption, they can also be usefully
classified by how each enters utility and production relationships of citi-
zens in nations. Definitionally, a truly global externality problem is one
in which the externality enters some production function, utility func-
tion, or both in every nation. Alternatively, a regional externality prob-
lem connotes that the externality only enters a prescribed subset of all
nations' utility and or production functions.
Using the neoclassical concept of utility and production function, the
various types of transnational environmental externalities can be cata-
logued. Let k, y) denote the production function for country i where
x denotes a vector of outputs, k a vector of resource inputs, and y a vector402- RALPHD'ARGE
of environmental externalities that influence production, but cannot be
controlled by autonomous decisions of firms in nation i. The vector y
may include such components as water quality in a river, lake, or estuary
jointly used by several nations, or a common airshed. Thus, F'(x, k, y)
represents the traditional economic concept of a production frontier for
country i, where given its domestic resources k, externality components
y which, prior to regulation, it does not control, and levels of production
for N—i of the N products it produces, the function yields the maximum
of the Nth product the country can produce. Omitting considerations of
environmental externalities within a nation for the moment, presum-
ing all y's are externally determined for the nation, then F' can be viewed
as a wealth measure for the ith country. As some or all of the components
of y are changed, then so must the actual (and perceived) wealth of the
ith country. In figure 1, a simple diagram is given where the country
produces two goods, and a component of y is changed which influences
the production of one of those goods, x2. Note thatrepresents an ex-
ternal diseconomy since maximum production of x2 is reduced for any pre-
determined production level of x1. If both products of country i are af-
fected by the transnational external diseconomy, then the curve in figure
I would move more uniformly inward.4
A glance at figure1 easily confirms several expectations on interna-
tional trade patterns. Countries affected by uncompensated transnationai
externalities in production will tend to produce more of those commodi-
ties less influenced by external diseconomies if firms in these countries re-
spond to international prices. If a country is relatively small and the
transnational externality is also relatively small so that compensation that
4. In the international trade literature, resource endowments traditionally are not
presumed to move internationally. Thus, with this assumption transnational environ-
mental externalities will shift the production curve inward, but generally not alter its
convexity properties regardless of how pervasive the external diseconomy. This can
be easily demonstrated. Since an external diseconomy in production may reduce the
productivity of inputs, as output shifts from one commodity to another, one can ex- t
pect diminishing marginal productivities of inputs to continue at an accelerated rate,
as production of the second commodity is increased, Consequently, convexity will gen-
erally be retained. Recently, Baumol, Starrett, and others have pointed out that the highly
pervasive externalities in production may destroy the convexity of production curve
for commodities if resources ate transferableinproduction. Transnational externali-
ties do not present this problem so long as resources are immobile. This is suggestive
that multinational corporations that contribute to international resource mobility may
at some point contribute to nonconvexity, making it more difficult to identify efficient
intracountry environmental control strategies. See W. J. Baumol and David Bradford,
'Detrimental Externalities and Non-Convexity ofthe Production Set," Economica
(May 1972); and D. Starrett, "On a Fundamental Non-Convexity in the Theory of Ex.
ternalities," Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper 115, 1970. er
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Figure 1
Effect of Transnational Externality
on a Country's Production Possibilities
x2
adjusts trade patterns has no perceptible influence on international trade
prices, then a clear measure of loss in wealth of the country can be ob-
tained. If the country produced at point bpriorto the transnational ex-
ternality or in its absence, but with the externality it produces at a, then
income loss measured by international prices equals the distance between
c and c'. However, if compensation or removal of the externality changes
international prices, then the direct linkage between measured income
losses and welfare losses is obviously broken. As an extreme example, let
us presume that compensation or payments for resolving the transna-
tional externality in production of commodity x2 shifts international
prices from ddtoc'c' in figure 1. The country thereby shifts its produc-
tion from g to b. But now it shifts its consumption point from n to h, thus
exporting more x2 for less x1. The country has been made worse off from
F'(x, k,y)
\
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the removal of or compensation for the transnational externality because
of international price effects. This is again obviously an extreme case, but
it demonstrates the problem of determining welfare loss when interna-
tional prices are affected by the compensation adjustment for external
diseconomies. It also underscores the point that even a receptor country
may lose by making a commitment to international arbitration of trans- -
frontierexternalities unless international trade effects are given adequate P
consideration. Normally, however, we should expect that with good infor-
mation, bilateral negotiation would lead to a net welfare gain for both
emitter and receptor countries.
A second aspect of consideration regarding wealth effects of transna-
tional externalities in production is how the externality enters production
functions in both emitter and receptor nations. Obvious alternatives in
the receptor case include:
1. effects on all or some resource inputs, either through reducing their
marginal productivity, total productivity, or both;
A
2. the choice of processes and techniques or factor proportions separable
from impacts on the productivity of inputs;
3. adjustment in qualitative aspects of the product which influences its -
value;
4. the need for additional technology or other inputs to alter inputs before
they can be used, such as water purification.
Note that 1 and 4 relate explicitly to particular factors of production, t
while 2 affects the production process directly. Finally, under 3, not only c
must one consider cost-minimizing control strategies, but also market de-
mand considerations to measure welfare losses. In terms of the functional
relationship P discussed earlier, the four impacts can be translated as
follows.
Table I contains a symbolic categorization of the various impacts of d
external diseconomies on production. For any particular transnational c
environmental externality, each impact in isolation or any combination d
may be operative. However, the policy implications for each in measuring e
wealth or income losses can be substantially different. For example, in
assessing the extent of receptor costs of the externality, if the only impact
is a shift downward in productivity of all inputs, then costs are easily c
measured applying international prices. This is also the case when all
that is required is some additional residuals processing. Alternatively, irs
the case of product change, costs must be determined as the difference in 0
net rent between production of the qualitatively different commodities,TRANST4ATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES 405
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Total productivity of all inputs
decreased uniformly
Process or technique F replaced by F' Transformation process of
substitution inputs to outputs altered
separable of effects on input
productivity
Change in qualitative F(x*, k, y*) New vector of outputs x with
aspects of output with x different qualitative charac-
teristics or dimensions
Additional technologicalF(x, k*, y*) Production function is altered
adjustment of other with to embody additional
inputs = F(x,k, y*) processes
i.e. beer produced in Olympia, Washington, or in St. Louis with varia-
tions due to water quality. Such an assessment requires explicit knowledge
of consumer preferences in the receptor country and countries it exports
to. Likewise, unless there are accurate measures of the cost of process
change or change in technique, it will be most difficult to assess receptor
nation costs from this source of impact. A simple dynamic example with
technological change will suffice to illustrate complexities here. A nation
downstream is affected by increasing deterioration in water quality. In
consequence, firms there respond by selecting a less water-intensive pro-
cluction process. Embodied technical change in this process leads to greater
efficiency in production anti efficiencies in production compensate par-
tially or offset completely inefficiencies due to water quality deterioration.
\\'here is the loss to the nation? It surely includes technology conversion
costs, but an unanticipated external economy has otherwise offset ex-
ternal diseconomies associated with poorer water quality. This example
is cited only to point out the difficulties inherent in measuring the wealth
or income loss of the receptor nation. Conceptually, the rule to follow
would be the so-called 'with and without' principle encountered in
a. Ft,*k represents the derivative of the production function with respect to externality
divided by the derivative of the production function with respect to input k.406- RALPHD'ARGE
benefit-cost analysis. Thus, an appropriate static measuring device of el
wealth-income loss is output valued at international prices with and with-
out the transnational externality. However, if there are underlying dy-
namic processes such as learning embodied in external cliseconomies, such
static measurements will be disputed in bilateral negotiation, particu-
larly with the adoption of the "polluter must pay" or absolute liability ti
principles.
In the emitter country, the same four cases of impacts on imputs (in a
positive sense) and shifts in processes are possible because of the country's
ability to use environmental assimilative capacity and cause downstream ti.
damages without compensation. When the transnational externality is
strictly related to production sectors in the several countries, it is signifi-
cant to ask whether the impact on factor use will be completely sym-
metrical. In other words, if the marginal productivity of a factor is re-
duced downstream, is it carried upstream for the same factor or is the up-
stream country's outward shift in Ft(x, k,y*)induced by different causes?
If, for example, the upstream country uses the river for upstream dump-
ing rather than incurring process changes (while the downstream effect t:
is to reduce the marginal productivity of a single factor downstream), then
assessment of damages is relatively straightforward with international
prices constant. However, if there are qualitative changes in the upstream
countries' product (whichis competitive or complementary with the
downstream countries' product that also undergoes qualitative changes),
then again demand conditions must be understood to assess damages and
measure the involuntary transfer in wealth.
Take two countries with equal factor endowments and resource size
facing competitive international prices that are constant, i.e. each country
is small in relation to global or regional markets. The upstream country
increases factor productivity per se by dispersing waste heat into the
streams rather than using cooling towers requiring 10 pet- cent of its pro-
ductive factors, while the downstream country experiences the need for
cooling towers in order to use river water for production of commodities
which requires, by assumption, 8 per cent of its Factors of production.
Since in neither case cEo productivity of individual factors or intei'national
prices shift, the composi don of output in the two countries would not
change. All that occurs, is that the emitter country receives a 10 pei cent
increase in factor income and the receptor an 8 pei cent decrease in fac-
tor income while the wot-Ici as a whole undergoes a net 2 per cent rise in
the amount of commodities produced by the two countries. If the ex-
ternality can only be corrected by stopping the heat emission upriver, then
it should not be. Allowing the externality to continue is economicallyE TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES 407
efficient,but distributionally adverse to the receptor country. Since there
generally will be no mechanism to require the emitter to provide compen-
sation, i.e. except by threat of receptor country or altruistic goals of the
1 emitter country, no transfer payment will occur. A "polluter pays" prin-
t- ciple similar to the one adopted by Organization for Economic Coopera-
y tion and Development (OECD) member countries where tile polluter
must pay for controls and not pay compensation for damages would lead
a to an inefficient allocation of resources in this case.
s What is important to note is that transnational production externali-
ties which are uncompensated induce distortions of production relation-
s ships in both emitter and receptor countries. Perceived wealth of both
1- changeas a result of the involuntary character of externalities. However,
it is very likely that the impact downstream, because of different factor
endowments, production technologies, factor mixes, and comparative ad-
vantage in commodities, will be different than the upstream country's
? impact. A guess might be that in most cases, the emitter country's firms
save in costs of additional technology, i.e. recycling and in-factor produc-
tivity per se, while the receptor country firms tend to lose in terms of re-
1 quired process or technical changes in production and qualitative aspects
of the commodities produced. In consequence, the usual implicit assump-
don that upstream and downstream control costs are similar in magnitude
is not likely to be valid.
To summarize this rather scattered discussion on the wealth effects of
transnational externalities in production: (1) these types of externalities
can be viewed as involuntary transfers of a nation's wealth; (2) if the ex-
ternality influences competitive international prices, then its resolution
by tile OECD "polluter pays" principle may economically harm the re-
ceptor country as well as the emitter country. Likewise, the "victim must
pay" principle may economically harm both emitter and receptor coun-
- tries.However, transnational externalities in production generally yield
a potential rise in income in one country and a fall in income in tile other.
in certain instances, where control costs or efficiencies are different be-
tween countries, it may pay to retain the externality and, if necessary, use
lump-sum transfers to achieve equity.
I WealthEffects from Transnational Externalities on Consumers
Thus far, tile discussion has been developed from a perspective of exter-
nalities in production, but a few words are added here to describe the im-
pact of externalities in final use or consumption as distinct from produc-U'(xi, y2),
(J2(x2, y2),
pxi =M1+ B,
px2 + ry2 = M2 —B;


























tion. In order to develop the idea of a wealth transfer resulting from
transnational externalities in consumption, I apply a simple graphical
technique first used by Dolbear.5 Let there be two countries with collec-
tive utility functions as follows:
(1)
where x1 and x2 are the quantities of a private good consumed in countries
1 and 2, and Y2 is the quantity of a private good consumed by 2, but yield-
ing an external diseconomy to 1.











Note that the usual strict concavity assumptions are specified for pref-
erences toward the two private goods, x and y. The significant difference,
however, is that individuals in country 1are presumed to undergo in-
creasing marginal disutility if the externality is intensified.
Next, a budget constraint for both countries is postulated:
or
where pandr are the given international prices for private goods x and
y, anti M, denotes the initial income of country 1. Negotiation for external
effects between I and 2 is allowed through payment of a bribe, B with
B0, which cancels out of equation 2'. For simplicity, we shall assume
p = 1 by suitable redefinition of quantity units of x, and that the exter-
nality anti consumption ofare strictly joint products.
In figure 2, indifference maps are depicted along with initial (before
5. F. T. Dolbear,Jr., "Onthe Theory of Optimum Externality," American Eco-
nomic Review (March 1967).
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n the externality appears) endowments.6 Country 2's indifference map is
identified with the origin 0. However, country l's indifference map is not.
c- Since1 cannot exchange Y2 in an international market, its budget con-
straint would be a sloped line commencing from point a, i.e. the country's
exchange price for Yz is initially zero; and the country will, given a choice,
be at a corner solution. As point a moves to the left, country I has a higher
L) budget.But, in order to represent I and 2's combined budget in x—y space,
the budget line and indifference map of I must be rotated in order to
be parallel with the slope of the combined budget line such that the sum
of 1 and 2's budget does not exceed their combined budget. Thus, the in.
difference map for country 1is rotated in x—y space so that x1 is always
measured from the aggregate budget line from right to left in figure 2.
Initial consumption is at point a where both 1 and 2 are consuming
x but neither isconsuming"Next, country 2 'purchases" the exter-
nality yielding commodity and moves to point Ii where the budget line
aa' is tangent to the indifference curve 22. Clearly, this point is not Pareto
optimal in a global sense, since residents of country 1suffer a loss of
utility and are moved involuntarily from indifference curve l'l' to 11.
By negotiation, the)' could achieve the contract curve cc, which implies
a reduction in intensity of the externality. It should be reemphasized that
country 1has control only over consumption of product x and cannot
either purchase or sell Ya' except by negotiating with 2, thereby ruling out
the development of a competitive market for the externality. Also, the
contract curve defined as cc is not one where marginal rates of substitution
[or x and y are equated with relative prices defined as l/r, although the
budget line of country 2, adjusted for fees or payments, must pass through
this tangency.
What we now wish to introduce are simplified versions of the "third
party liability" (TP) and "victim must pay" (VP) principles. First, the
TP rule is presumed to require that country 2 compensate country 1 for
d all disutilities caused by tile externality.7 With negotiation and the TP
LI
is 6. Collective indifference maps for each country are presumed to exist which effec-
e tively assumes away difficulties of interpersonal comparisons within countries.
r- 7. Note that country 2 by assumption can only regulate the externality's impact by
reducing consumption of y., or paying country 1 some x to tolerate the external dis-
economy. Thus, country 2cannot provide controls and country 1implicitlycannot
undertake defensive expenditures internally to reduce the intensity of the externality.
Recently, the OECD member countries agreed to implement a "polluter pays" princi-
ple which in effect requires the polluting firm to pay all control costs and the receptor
firm oi- consunier to pay all residual damages. Also, transfronticr pollution was ex-
plicitly excluded from this agreement. For clarity, we adopt the following terminology:
polluter being responsible for all control costs and residual damages is denoted as the410- RALPH D'ARGE
y
Figure 2
Initial Purchases of 1 and 2
rule specified, the point z' on the contract curve in figure 2 is achieved.
Note that if the TP rule is specified, damages cannot occur or must be
paid in kind, i.e. reduced noise only, then point a will be achieved once
again but at a loss to at least one, if not both countries. Also, a TP rule
which specified that the damaged country must be made better off while
the liable country Cannot be better off, will result irs negotiation to the
contract curve. The ultimate point achieved on the contract curve in this
"third party principle" where third party connotes the implicit need for an outside
enforcement body or court in order to establish exclusive right for the receptor na-
tion; polluter pays only the control Costs and no residual dansages is referred to as the
"polluter pays" principle. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
iisen t, Recom 1nendatlon of the Council Concerning International Economic Aspects
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case will be to the left of point z'infigure 2 at point z", i.e. x1 will be
higher while y and x2 will be lower than for the first PP rule.
%Ve next turn to the case of VP rule. By VP rule, we mean that there is
a rule which specifies that country 2 by inadvertently creating an external
diseconomy is not required to compensate country 1 for damages. Also,
there are assumed to be no provisions contained in this rule which would
impede private negotiation between affected countries. Clearly, in this
case a negotiated settlement would involve a payment from country1
to country 2. Costless negotiation would result in a distribution of x and y
on the contract curve between z'andz"infigure 2. Between z' and z"
on the contract curve, both countries 2 and 1 are made no worse off and
perhaps better off than at point b.
A TP rule, as specified here leads to a negotiated settlement on the con-
tract curve cconor to the left of point z', while a VP rule leads to a nego-
tiated settlement on or to the right of point z". Thus, the distribution
of wealth between countries is altered by adoption of a TP or VP rule
which changes the consumption patterns for x and y. Since negotiation
leads to attainment of the contract curve regardless of rules, Coase is cor-
rect in asserting short-run efficiency.8 The above derivation can be taken
as a proof of the "Coase proposition" amended as follows: regardless of
whether a TP or VP rule is adopted, "perturbations" arising from non-
market forces can be resolved through negotiations of the countries af-
fected, and provided transactions costs are zero afterperturbation,Pareto
efficiency is attained in the short run and in the long run if consumers and
factors of production are immobile internationally.9 In Appendix I, a
simple model of international production is analyzed which demon-
strates that tinder several rather general assumptions neither the TP nor
VP rules will achieve global production efficiency without other interna-
d tionally agreed upon secondary controls. The assumptions include certain
types of positive transactions costs and that countries are essentially price
ce takers. A second assertion which becomes obvious in the diagrammatic
le analysis is that with more or less continuous perturbations and negotia-
le tion, a VP rule will have "wealth" effects toward making some countries
worse off, that is, if one assumes that, ordinarily, the emitter country is
made better off by "creating" external diseconomies. Not unlike gam-
bling, there will be some countries that emerge as winners and others as
tie
a-
be 8.R. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal oj Law and ECOnOmICS (August
p. 1960).
9. See Appendix Ifor a discussion of the possibilities when transaction costs are
positive.412 - RALPHD'ARGEf
losers.Since the perturbations are unforeseen in this world, it would ap-
pear Paretian in spirit to adopt a TP rule.
Some Brief Notes on Bilateral Negotiation and Game Theory
Whether the "third party must pay," "victim must pay," or some inter-
mediate principle is implicitly or explicitly adopted, there are potential
gains from trade via bilateral negotiation. Both the emitter and receptor
have incentives to undertake negotiation.1° Thus, in terms of game analy-
sis, unadjusted externalities without threats of conflict are essentially the
form of cooperative or Nash types of games. Both countries can potentially
gain by cooperation although each may decide that it is in its best interest
not to cooperate, or pretend not to and thereby possibly achieve a greater
expected threat payoff or value. \Vith externalities generally, it can be
expected that side paymenis will be made in order to achieve cooperation.
Thus, the classical Nash cooperative solution without side payments ap-
pears to be inappropriate. Side payments might enter, for example, if the
upstream and downstream control costs were different.
In order to illustrate some basic problems involved in negotiation for
transnational externalities, we shall resort to a simple example. Let it be
assumed that there are two countries 1 and 2 where 2 is the emitter and
1 the receptor. Downstream damages are 10 prior to control and 2 with
control, with upstream gains due to savings in pollution control of 4.
Downstream control costs are assumed to be 6. There are two decisions
for each country that are not mutually exclusive, namely whether to join
the coalition and at what level to participate, i.e., how much control to
provide. We shall concentrate on the decision whether to cooperate or
not presuming there is no double layered process of irrevocable agree-
ment to negotiate which is followed by negotiations. Also, it is assumed
for the moment that both announce their intention to negotiate simul-
taneously with offers. Finally, neither country is assumed to know pre-
cisely the other's control costs and the emitter country does not accurately
know the level of downstream damages.
Given the previous assumptions and a set of expectational values of
each country, the maximum bid and expected bid of the receptor country
and minimum acceptable offer and expected offer for the emitter country
10. That is, assuming the externalityis continuous over time, has inadvertently
arisen, and the emitter, if he does not pay, must cease the activity-generating externali-
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canbe established. To make things simple, we shall set the following
probabilities.
1. Country 2's government believes the probability of downstream damages
being avoided by control of 10 is .2 and the probability of damages being
avoided of 2 is .8. Thus the expected value of damages avoided by controls
is simply: E=.2(10) + .8(2).
2. Country 2's government believes the probability of the downstream coun-
try's control costs being 4 is.5, and the probability of these costs being
being 6 is .5.
3. Country l's government believes the probability of the upstream coun-
try's control costs being 4 is.5, and the probability of them being 6 is.5.
Presuming the "victim must pay" principle is in effect, the maximum
bid that 1 would make to 2 would be initial damages less damages after
control which is 8. The minimum acceptable offer for country 2, of course,
is 4. These amounts are in effect the "threat payoffs" of the Nash type of
game for coalitions. Thus, there are clearly gains from negotiation if nego-
tiation can be initiated. However, note that "expected rent" beyond pay-
ment for control by country 2 from country 1 prior to negotiation is neg-
ative, i.e. rent defined as 2's expected value of downstream damages re-
duced is .2(10) + .8(2) less 2's expected value of l's control costs .5(6) +
.5(4). Thus, 2 may not undertake negotiations clue to the fact that it ex-
pects l's offer will be less than its control costs.11 Alternatively, 1 will de-
cide to attempt negotiation with 2 because its expectation of gain would
be 8 —.5(4)—.5(6)which exceeds its gain of 2 from instituting control
unilaterally.
In figure 3, the possible bargaining positions and "threat payoffs" for
this problem are depicted. Any point on SS' is Pareto efficient in that all
gains from negotiations on the transfrontier diseconomy between coun-
tries 1 and 2 are exhausted. Which point on SS' is ultimately selected via
negotiation depends on the rules established for negotiation, i.e., once-
and-for-all bid by the receptor, a sequence of simultaneous bids and de.
mands, or sequential bids and demands. Also, the point depends on the
exact specifications of the VP or TP rules. For example, if a TP principle
is adopted which specifies the emitter country cannot be any better off
than before the emergence of the transirontier externality, point S will
11. It should be pointed out that this grossly simplifies expectation problems in that
we omit consideration of country 2 calculating country l's expectations and likewise
country 1 calculating country 2's expectations on country 1. adinfinitum. Herewe only
consider country 1 and 2's expectations directly.TI
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Figure 3
Efficiency Locus for Transfrontier
Externality Between Two Countries
Gainsto
Country 2
Gains to Country 1
bethe negotiated solution. Alternatively, if under the VP principle the re-
ceptor country cannot be made better off, then S' will be selected. Finally,
if transactions-negotiation costs are introduced, then itis conceptually
possible for country 2 to decide not to negotiate under either the TP or
VP principles, since the country a priori perceives that it would be better
off without it. (See Appendix I for an elaboration on this point.)
This most simple example of a cooperative game between two countries
on transfrontier externalities underscores several points. First, the bid-
ding process itself, i.e. who bids first and how binding is the bid, may sig-TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALiTIES 415
nificantlyalter the outcome. In the example above, country 2 will not
establish negotiations or make the first bid because expected gains are
negative. Second, precise information on damages and control costs by
both countries will reduce the risk associated with bidding too high or
setting payments too low. Under the TP principle, this risk factor is in-
tensified since the emitter country now confronts uncertainty with respect
to both receptor damages and downstream control costs. Alternatively,
under the VP principle, the country making the payment, i.e. receptor,
confronts uncertainty only with regard to the emitter's control costs. Such
a reduction of uncertainty on information does not occur in OECDs
"polluter pays" principle where the emitter is uncertain on damages and
downstream control costs and the receptor is uncertain as to upstream
control costs.
Conclusions
The major conclusions of this paper are as follows.
1. Transnational externalities in production or consumption are in-
voluntary transfers of perceived wealth among emitter and receptor
countries. Given the general acceptance of the national sovereignty
principle, such externalities of a significant magnitude will in gen-
eral only be resolvable via bilateral negotiation with side payments,
usually from receptor to emitter.
2. Unadjusted transnational externalities, if their resolution through
compensation or other means, shifts international prices, may make
a single emitter or rece p/or nation better or worse off. Thus, the link
between wealth-income and welfare of a country is broken. In order
for the receptor nation to be made worse off, international prices
must be markedly affected and willingness to pay for the commodity,
influenced by the externality, must be strong if its relative price in-
creases as a result of compensation or weak if its relative price de-
creases resulting from compensation.
3. Transnational externalities, unlike domestic externalities in pro-
duction, will generally not cause a shift from concavity to convexity
of domestic production functions. This is due to the usual underly-
ing assumption in the classical trade literature that resources are
mobile nationally but not internationally.
4. A "victim must pay" principle or a "third party" principle will lead
to an inefficient long-run allocation of resources between countries,'116 - RALPHD'ARGE
provided resources are mobile between them and certain assump-
tions on positive transaction costs are valid.'2 These assumptions
are that firms only respond to realized profits in international loca-
tion decisions and are price takers. To achieve global efficiency in
resource allocation, some other types of controls need to be imple-
mented such as restrictions on international location. The same in-
efficiencies might arise for transnational consumption externalities
unless consumers are not internationally mobile.
5. Transactions costs in negotiating for externalities are shown to
markedly affect the expected outcomes of bilateral negotiation. If
such costs are high, countries are generally risk averters, and these
costs must be borne by the receptor country under the "third party"
principle, then it can be expected that pollution will be greater than
is desirable from a global viewpoint. There appears to be a basic
asymmetry in incentives for negotiation of externalities between the
"victim must pay" and "third party" principles, when transactions
costs are positive. Under the VP rule, both emitter and receptor have
incentives to negotiate and thereby incur transactions costs. Alter-
natively, with the TP rule, only the receptor has such incentives
since the emitter is always better off by not negotiating.'3
6. Unidirectional transnational externalities were shown to be as con-
ceptualizable as a special case of cooperative games under the "vic-
tim must pay" principle. It was argued that rules on negotiation may
substantially alter gains between countries undertaking bilateral
negotiation for transfrontier externalities and thereby influence in-
ternational efficiency in the utilization of resources.
12. See Appendix I for a semi-rigorousproof.
13. See Appendix I.
—mt.